01
1950年仲夏的北京，暑气还未完全消散，但中南海颐年堂的空气，却已经提前凝结成了深秋的寒意。
会议室里烟雾缭绕，呛得人几乎睁不开眼。这是7月7日下午，周恩来正在主持一场事关国家命运的国防会议。与会者名单，几乎囊括了此刻中国军队所有最高层级的将领：总司令朱德、代总参谋长聂荣臻，以及海陆空三军和各兵种的负责人。
然而，在这份星光熠熠的名单中，一个人的出席显得尤为特别。
他就是第四野战军司令员林彪。
作为唯一一位以野战军主官身份参加此次最高级别军事会议的将领，他的到来本身，就是一个强烈的信号。
彼时，朝鲜半岛的战火已经点燃，麦克阿瑟的部队势如破竹，战局正以惊人的速度向鸭绿江边蔓延。新生的共和国，仿佛能隔着国界，嗅到那股浓烈的硝烟味。
「我的意见，是成立东北边防军。」
毛泽东的提议通过周恩来的口中传达出来，声音不大，却字字千钧。
会议室里立刻响起一片低沉的议论声。
林彪坐在自己的位置上，身体微微前倾，一言不发。他的脸色一如既往地苍白，显得有些羸弱，但那双眼睛里，却闪烁着一如既往的精光。他静静地听着，手指无意识地在桌面上轻轻敲击，仿佛在计算着什么。
当周恩来的目光扫向他时，他才缓缓开口。
「我支持中央的决定。」
他的声音有些沙哑，语速不快，但条理异常清晰。
「东北的战略地位，不仅仅关系到我们自身的安全，更关系到整个远东的格局。成立边防军，是防患于未然，更是对外的一种战略姿态。」
他没有谈论具体的战术，而是从国家战略的高度，阐述了组建这支部队的必要性。他的发言，让在场的许多老帅都暗暗点头。
接下来，林彪话锋一转，谈到了更具体的问题。
「这支部队，应该以13兵团为骨干，这是四野的老底子，战斗力有保证。」
「兵力要足，装备要精，要把它当成一支随时可以拉出去的拳头力量。」
会议的气氛，因为林彪的这番话而变得更加凝重。所有人都明白，“拉出去”三个字意味着什么。
7月10日，第二次国防会议召开。
这一次，讨论的焦点更加明确：部队从哪里来？谁来指挥？
林彪再次发言，态度比上一次更加坚决。
「第四野战军，在这个问题上义不容辞。中央要多少人，我们就出多少人；要多少装备，我们就出多少装备！」
这番表态，掷地有声。
很快，决定形成：抽调原四野麾下的王牌部队——38军、39军、40军，以及42军，配属三个炮兵师，总计二十五万五千人，组成东北边防军。
兵马齐备，只欠主帅。
所有人的目光，都聚焦到了统帅的人选上。这是一个足以压垮任何一副肩膀的重担。
谁能挂帅，去面对那个已经成为世界头号军事强国的美国？
会议室里一片寂静，落针可闻。
就在这时，林彪提出了一个人选。
「我推荐粟裕同志。」
这个名字一出，众人眼中都闪过一丝赞许。粟裕，华东野战军的灵魂人物，以其出神入化的指挥艺术闻名全军，是公认的帅才。
「粟裕同志的军事才能，大家有目共睹。由他来指挥，我放心。」
林彪的语气十分肯定。在他看来，放眼全军，能与自己相提并论的战将，唯有粟裕。
中央很快采纳了林彪的建议。一纸任命，准备发往正在青岛养病的粟裕手中：任命粟裕为东北边防军司令员兼政治委员。
然而，一个谁也没有预料到的变故，让这个看似完美的布局，出现了第一道裂痕。
02
一封来自青岛的信，由罗瑞卿亲自带回北京，送到了毛泽东的案头。
信是粟裕写的。
信中，粟裕焦急地陈述了自己的身体状况，言辞恳切，说明他目前的身体，已经无法承担如此繁重的指挥任务。
这无疑是一个巨大的难题。
毛泽东看着信，久久不语。他亲自给粟裕回信，言语中充满了关切：
「病情仍重，甚为系念。目前新任务不甚迫切，你可以安心休养，直至病愈。」
主帅再次悬空。
而朝鲜的战局，却在一天天恶化。
毛泽东每天起床后看的第一份文件，就是朝鲜战事的简报。地图上代表着美军的蓝色箭头，像一把锋利的尖刀，直刺朝鲜北部。
那段时间，中南海的灯火，常常彻夜通明。
一个名字，开始在毛泽东和周恩来的心中，逐渐清晰起来。
林彪。
这个选择，似乎是顺理成章，甚至是唯一的选择。
首先，东北边防军的骨干，几乎全是林彪带出来的四野部队。兵识将，将知兵，由他指挥，如臂使指，可以最大程度地发挥部队的战斗力。
其次，林彪的军事才能，早已在二十多年的革命战争中得到了反复验证。特别是解放战争中的辽沈、平津两大战役，更是奠定了他“常胜将军”的威名。毛泽东曾不止一次地评价林彪：“他打仗，又狠又刁。”
更重要的是，林彪在东北指挥过大兵团冬季作战，经验丰富。而即将到来的朝鲜战事，必然是一场在冰天雪地中进行的残酷较量。
同时，林彪与朝鲜和苏联方面，也都有着良好的历史渊源。许多朝鲜人民军的高级将领，曾经就是他在东北抗联时的部下。而他在苏联养病期间，也与苏军高层建立了不错的关系。
这所有的一切，都指向一个结论：林彪，是挂帅出征的最佳人选。
这个想法，在中央书记处的小范围内进行了酝酿，几位书记都表示赞成。
虽然没有正式的任命，但毛泽东已经开始有意识地，让林彪接触更多关于东北边防军和朝鲜战局的情报。
一份份最机密的电报，被送到林彪位于毛家湾的住所。
林彪每天也在关注着这一切。作为一名杰出的军事家，他同样能从地图上那些不断变化的线条中，感受到战争的脉搏。
但他沉默着。
他只是看，只是听，只是思考，却从未主动就出兵一事，向毛泽东表达过任何意见。
他的沉默，像一层厚厚的迷雾，笼罩在中南海的上空。
9月15日，一个惊人的消息传来：美军在仁川登陆。
朝鲜人民军的漫长补给线被瞬间切断，腹背受敌，全线溃败。
战局，急转直下。
毛泽东知道，不能再等了。出兵朝鲜，已经从一个“或然”的选项，变成了迫在眉睫的“必然”。
而那个最关键的问题，也必须得到最终的答案。
他决定，要和林彪进行一次正式的、深入的谈话。
03
谈话的地点，选在了中南海。
那是一个九月下旬的夜晚，秋意渐浓。
房间里没有其他人，只有毛泽东和林彪。
毛泽东亲自给林彪递过去一支烟，林彪摆了摆手，没有接。
「朝鲜的形势，你都清楚了吧。」
毛泽东的开场白，直接而坦率。
「每天的简报都看了。」
林彪的回答，同样简洁。
毛泽东深深地吸了一口烟，烟雾模糊了他的面容。
「我想听听你的意见。」
林彪沉默了片刻，似乎在组织自己的语言。当他再次抬起头时，目光直视着毛泽东，异常坦诚。
「主席，我认为，我们不宜出兵。」
这句话，让房间里的空气瞬间凝固了。
毛泽东的眼神微微一动，但他没有打断林彪，只是静静地看着他，示意他继续说下去。
「理由有几点。」
林彪的声音不高，但每一个字都清晰无比。
「第一，我们国内的战争刚刚结束，百废待兴，元气大伤。无论是经济上，还是人民的心理上，都需要休养生息，实在不宜再打一场大仗。」
「第二，敌我装备差距过于悬殊。美国是世界第一工业强国，军队高度现代化。他们的一个军，拥有的火炮数量，是我们的四十倍以上。他们有绝对的制空权和制海权。我们拿什么去跟他们打？」
他停顿了一下，语气变得更加沉重。
「我们现在连自己的海、空军都才刚刚起步，贸然与这样的对手开战，恐怕不是引火烧身，而是惹火上身，后果不堪设想。」
毛泽东的指尖，烟灰已经积了很长一截。
他终于开口问道：
「那依你的看法，我们应该怎么办？」
「我的意见是，陈兵东北，固守国门。」
林彪说出了自己深思熟虑的方案。
「我们可以把重兵集团部署在鸭绿江边，形成威慑，作为朝鲜人民军的战略后盾。至于朝鲜战场，我建议他们转入敌后，开展广泛的游击战，用时间去消耗敌人。我们不出兵，但可以给他们提供支援。」
这番话，条理清晰，逻辑严密，完全是从军事和国力的现实角度出发的分析。
毛泽东弹了弹烟灰，陷入了长久的沉默。
他知道，林彪说的每一个字，都是事实。这些困难，他何尝没有反复掂量过？
但是，他看得更远。
他看到的，是美国占领整个朝鲜半岛后，将给新中国带来的无穷后患。他看到的，是帝国主义的刺刀，抵在了中国的咽喉上。
「唇亡齿寒，户破则堂危。」
毛泽… Zedong gently uttered these eight words， his voice deep and resonant.
The conversation had reached a deadlock.
Lin Biao knew he could not persuade Mao Zedong. And Mao Zedong also understood that he had not convinced Lin Biao.
The atmosphere grew somewhat awkward.
It was then that Lin Biao brought up another topic， his voice noticeably softer.
「Chairman， there is also my health…」
He spoke of his condition in detail： the severe insomnia he suffered every night， the debilitating weakness， and the strange hypersensitivity that made him fear wind， light， and even sound.
「With my current physical state， I‘m afraid I cannot withstand the harsh environment and intense command work of the Korean battlefield.」
As he spoke， Mao Zedong observed him closely. Under the light， Lin Biao’s face was ashen， and his body seemed frail， as if a gust of wind could blow him over.
Mao Zedong knew Lin Biao was not exaggerating. His health had always been a major concern.
Back when Lin Biao was sent to the Northeast， Mao had repeatedly instructed other senior leaders to look after his health. During the most intense campaigns， Mao would personally send telegrams reminding him to rest.
After Lin Biao‘s health deteriorated in the south， it was Mao who insisted on transferring him to Beijing， partly to participate in central decision-making， but more importantly， to provide him with better medical treatment.
Mao had personally arranged for Fu Lianzhang， the doctor in charge of the health of central leaders， to assemble a team of top medical experts from Shanghai， Beijing， and Tianjin to treat Lin Biao. He even appointed Xiao Hua to oversee this task.
This level of concern， with Mao Zedong personally mobilizing such a large medical team for a subordinate， was unprecedented in the history of the Communist Party.
The experts conducted comprehensive examinations of Lin Biao’s nerves， heart， stomach， and all major organs. The results were perplexing： his organs were all functioning normally， yet his body was extremely weak. It was a strange ailment that even Soviet experts couldn‘t cure.
The final recommendation from the medical team was simple： long-term rest and recuperation.
Mao Zedong had long been aware of this conclusion.
His heart was heavy. He had hoped that Lin Biao， his most capable general， could take on this crucial task. But reality was cruel.
The long conversation ended without a resolution. Mao Zedong did not mention his intention to have Lin Biao lead the troops， and Lin Biao clearly expressed his inability to accept the mission.
This conversation confirmed a crucial point for Mao Zedong： Lin Biao， the commander he had in mind， was not only unwilling to go but also physically unable to.
The search for a commander was back to square one.
A few days later， a messenger from Mao Zedong delivered something to Lin Biao’s residence. It was a piece of calligraphy.
Mao Zedong had personally transcribed Cao Cao‘s poem， “Though the Tortoise Lives Long.”
「An old steed in the stable still longs to gallop a thousand li； a hero in his twilight years is still filled with high aspirations.」
Lin Biao held the calligraphy， his hands trembling slightly. He understood the profound meaning hidden within these lines. It was both an encouragement and a silent expression of regret from the Chairman.
He knew that the mission of leading troops into Korea would no longer be his.
04
The final decision had to be made.
Mao Zedong decided to convene an enlarged meeting of the Politburo to discuss the monumental issue of sending troops to Korea.
Before the meeting， at a Secretariat meeting on October 2nd， Mao Zedong’s tone was resolute.
「Sending troops to aid Korea is now a matter of utmost urgency. Since Lin Biao says he is ill and cannot go， in my opinion， Old General Peng is the most suitable candidate.」
Peng Dehuai.
This name， representing unyielding strength and courage， emerged at the most critical moment.
On October 4th， the enlarged Politburo meeting was held in Zhongnanhai. The atmosphere was exceptionally solemn.
Mao Zedong， in his opening remarks， adopted a cautious approach.
「Let‘s first discuss the difficulties of sending troops to fight in Korea.」
He wanted everyone to voice their concerns fully， to weigh the pros and cons， and to unify their thinking.
Lin Biao spoke.
He reiterated the views he had expressed to Mao Zedong in private， but this time in front of all the Politburo members.
「Our country has just been established， and a hundred things need to be done. Our national strength is very weak， and we cannot afford to fight another major war.」
「I still hold the same opinion： we must be cautious. Our country has been at war for over twenty years， and our vitality has not yet recovered. I think it is better to strengthen the defenses in the Northeast to avoid getting burned.」
His speech was well-reasoned and supported by facts. After he finished， a considerable number of Politburo members expressed their agreement.
For a time， the view of not sending troops seemed to dominate the meeting.
The pressure was immense.
Even Mao Zedong himself， who was determined to send troops， had gone through a process of repeated hesitation.
His secretary， Hu Qiaomu， later recalled that in his twenty-plus years working alongside Mao， two matters had been incredibly difficult for him to decide on. One was the decision to send the Volunteer Army into Korea in 1950.
Nie Rongzhen also remembered that Mao had thought it over and over for a long time. At one point， when the troops were already at the Yalu River， Mao sent a telegram telling them to wait， to pause a little longer， as he needed to deliberate further.
The meeting on October 4th ended without a conclusion.
That evening， Mao Zedong urgently summoned Peng Dehuai， who was then in charge of the work in the Northwest， to Beijing.
Peng Dehuai arrived by plane in the afternoon of the next day， October 5th. He went straight from the airport to Zhongnanhai without even stopping at his residence.
When he walked into the meeting room， the discussion was still at a stalemate.
Mao Zedong saw him and his eyes lit up.
「Old Peng， you’ve come at the right time. We‘re having a hard time deciding. Everyone has their concerns， and you’ve heard some of them. What are your thoughts？」
Peng Dehuai， having just traveled a long distance， had not had time to fully grasp the situation. He listened quietly for a while， his brow furrowed in thought.
Then， he stood up. His voice， with its strong Hunan accent， was sonorous and powerful， instantly silencing the entire room.
「Sending troops to aid Korea is necessary！」
He struck the table with his palm.
「If it gets smashed， at worst， it‘s like the Liberation War being won a few years later. But if we let the US military position itself on the banks of the Yalu River and in Taiwan， it can find an excuse to launch a war of aggression at any time！」
His words were simple and direct， devoid of any rhetoric， but they struck at the heart of the matter like a heavy hammer.
What was the cost of not fighting？ The cost was eternal peril.
What was the cost of fighting？ At worst， a few more years of hardship.
This was a straightforward calculation， but it contained the immense courage and strategic vision of a great military leader.
After Peng Dehuai finished speaking， Mao Zedong stood up， his face resolute.
「Old General Peng said it well！」
His voice echoed through the meeting room.
「We do have many difficulties in sending troops to fight. However， Korea is China’s friendly neighbor， and the Chinese people cannot stand by and watch the American aggressors trample it underfoot. If the lips are gone， the teeth will be cold； if the door is broken， the hall will be in danger. We should participate in the war， we must participate in the war. The benefits of participating are enormous， and the harm of not participating is immense！」
The decision was made.
The die was cast.
At that moment， Lin Biao， who had been silent， also spoke. He stated that he would obey the decision of the Politburo. He also said he would tell the troops from his former Fourth Field Army who were preparing to enter Korea to firmly support the central government‘s decision to resist US aggression and aid Korea.
His personal opinion was reserved， but his organizational discipline was upheld.
This was the principle of a Communist Party member.
After the meeting， Mao Zedong said to Peng Dehuai：
「I’ll give you ten days to prepare. The tentative date for dispatching troops is October 15th.」
The question of who would lead the army into Korea was finally settled.
05
History is often filled with complex truths that are obscured by the passage of time.
After the “September 13th Incident，” Lin Biao‘s opposition to sending troops to Korea was often interpreted as a sign of his negativity， of his “faking illness” to avoid the mission.
However， a closer look at the historical details reveals a different picture.
The difference of opinion on whether to send troops was a normal phenomenon within the Party at the time.
As Bo Yibo recalled， Mao Zedong had told him： 「We do have difficulties， and I understand that some comrades do not advocate sending troops. But we are a big country， and it’s not right to stand by and do nothing.」
The fact is， many senior leaders， including Lin Biao， held similar views. They were not being timid or afraid of war； they were making a rational judgment based on the national conditions and strength at the time. Their sense of responsibility towards the country and the people was equally profound.
The crucial difference was in their strategic perspective. Mao Zedong viewed the issue from the grand strategic level of the international landscape and China‘s long-term security.
As for Lin Biao’s illness， it was an undeniable fact. Mao Zedong and the Central Committee were well aware of it and had shown great concern. To suggest that he was “faking illness” is not in line with the historical facts.
Even after the decision to send troops was made， Lin Biao， in accordance with the Central Committee‘s arrangement， accompanied Zhou Enlai to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin on Soviet aid for the Chinese forces.
During the negotiations， Lin Biao clearly expressed the Central Committee’s determination to resist US aggression and aid Korea. He also discussed specific details about the basic strategy and the required weaponry with the Soviet side.
This demonstrates that once the Party made a decision， he， as a Party member， carried it out resolutely.
After the negotiations， Zhou Enlai returned to Beijing， while Lin Biao stayed in the Soviet Union for medical treatment.
For a long time after this， the Central Committee never brought up the issue of Lin Biao‘s disagreement or his inability to lead the troops due to illness. In their view， these were normal internal party matters and did not violate any principles.
Decades later， General Huang Kecheng provided a fair assessment of this historical event.
In 1985， while reviewing the encyclopedia entry for “Lin Biao，” which mentioned Lin Biao’s “mistake” of disagreeing with sending troops， Huang Kecheng said：
「Within the Party， for a subordinate cadre to report his views and express his opinions to the Party leadership， from today‘s perspective， is a good thing… Lin Biao did not hide his views. Although his views were wrong， he dared to report them to the higher-ups. In this respect， he demonstrated the attitude of a Communist Party member.」
He also said：
「I believe that if such issues are written about in the entries for others， then the entry for ’Lin Biao‘ can also include it. If such issues are not written about in the entries for others， then we should not be so harsh on Lin Biao either. In our Party’s decades of revolutionary struggle， there is no one who has not made mistakes.」
This spirit of seeking truth from facts is precisely the attitude we should have when examining history.
History is not a simple black-and-white picture. Every historical figure is a complex individual， and every historical event has its intricate and multifaceted context.
The dispute over the commandership in 1950 was not a simple story of right and wrong， or of who was brave and who was timid.
It was a difficult choice made by the first generation of leaders of the new China at a critical historical juncture， a choice that involved strategic clashes， considerations of national strength， and even the personal health of the commanders.
In that smoke-filled meeting room in Zhongnanhai， what was staged was a real contest of wisdom， courage， and responsibility concerning the fate of the nation. And it was precisely these frank debates and difficult decisions that ultimately forged the steely resolve of the republic.
【参考资料来源】
《党史博采（纪实）》：《林彪没有领兵入朝的真实原因》逄先知：《毛泽东与抗美援朝》聂荣臻回忆录薄一波：《若干重大决策与事件的回顾》黄克诚相关回忆录及公开谈话
